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THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, 1936-1940
By

REUBEN OPPENHEIMER*

In four terms,' the Supreme Court has decided over one
hundred cases dealing, in whole or in part, with questions
of administrative law. Some of these decisions are legal
landmarks, but the chief significance of the period is the
philosophy of judicial review which the cases as a whole
represent.
The emphasis of the decisions in the period immediately
preceding was on the limits which must be observed in the
delegation of legislative power to administrative boards
and commissions, and the requisites of the fair hearing
which those boards and commissions must accord.2 The
cases in the period here considered give ample proof of
the extent to which those signposts have been followed
both in legislative draftsmanship and in administrative
procedure. That the Court is still concerned with those
fundamentals is shown by the recent decisions which afford
additional protection to the basic rights of fair play. In* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1917, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1920, Harvard University.
'The cases here considered are those decided in the October Terms of
1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939. They are reported in Volumes 299 U. S. to 310
U,. S., both inclusive.
Acknowledgment is gratefully made to Dean James .N. Landis, of the
Harvard Law School, who read this article in a preliminary stage and
made valuable suggestions.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446
(1935) ; Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed.
1570 (1935) ; Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 56
S. Ct. 654, 80 L. Ed. 1015 (1936) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (1936) ; Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936) ; Morgan v.
United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. Ed. 1288 (1936). An
attempt was made to analyze the import of these cases in an earlier article
by the writer, The SuLpreme Court and Administrative Law (1937) 37 Col.
L. Rev. 1.
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deed, the scope of judicial review has been broadened at
the same time that its intensity has in certain respects been
modified. But in the cases as a group, far more than at
any other time in the history of administrative law, the
judicial and administrative processes appear, not as protagonists of conflicting ideals, but as companion instruments in the workings of our government.
The range of the decisions extends from broad questions of the manner in which constitutional responsibility
can be delegated to analyses of specific factual situations.
Cases in administrative law do not fit well into pigeonholes, for they are not exercises in analytical classification,
but rather applications of a trained judicial instinct which
can perceive and weigh the intangibles whose reconciliation is so often the test of statesmanship. Nevertheless, a
consideration of the different phases of the administrative
process with which the decisions deal reflects, to some extent, both the varied nature of the problems presented and
the consistency of the approach to those problems.
DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENT

The Court, in two important decisions, has further
clarified the extent to which Congress can constitutionally
delegate functions to the President.3 In the case of U. S. v.
4 the Court passed upon the constitutionalCurtiss-Wright,
ity of a proclamation of the President, in pursuance of a
Congressional joint resolution providing that "if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and
munitions of war in the United States to those countries
now engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute
to the reestablishment of peace between those countries,
and if after consultation with the governments of other
Questions of delegation of power by a state are usually to be passed
upon only by the state, not the Federal courts. Great Northern R. Co. v.
Washington, 300 U. S. 154, 57 S. Ct. 397, 81 L. Ed. 573 (1937) ; Highland
Farms Dairy, Inc., v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 57 S. Ct. 549, 81 L. Ed. 835
(1937)
Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U. S. 297, 59 S. Ct. 170, 83 L. Ed. 182
(1938); Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U. S. 535, 59 S. Ct. 705, 83
L. Ed. 968 (1939).
4299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936).
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American Republics and with their cooperation, as well as
that of such other governments as he may deem necessary,
he makes proclamation to that effect, it shall be unlawful
to sell, . . . any arms or munitions of war in any place
in the United States to the countries now engaged in that
armed conflict . . ." The appellees were indicted for conspiring to sell arms of war to one of the countries then
engaged in the Chaco War in violation of the provisions
of the proclamation. One of their contentions was that
the joint resolution attempted to effect an invalid delegation of legislative power to the Executive. The validity of
the resolution and the proclamation were sustained.
The Bush case5 involved the validity of action taken
under the flexible tariff provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Under this Act, the President is charged with the duty of
approving, by proclamation, the rates, duty and changes
in classification and in basis of value specified in any report
of the Tariff Commission, "if in his judgment such rates
of duty and changes are shown by such investigation of
the Commission to be necessary to equalize such differences in costs of production." After public notice and
hearing, the Commission recommended an increase in the
ad valorem rate on the American selling price of canned
clams imported from Japan. The President's proclamation stated that this change in duty so recommended was,
in his judgment, necessary, although the appellee contended that the Commission had computed the cost of the
Japanese production of clams on an erroneous basis. The
Supreme Court, in upholding the action of the President,
refused to consider the reasoning which underlay his
action.
These two cases, each of which upheld a delegation of
power to the President in the exercise of different kinds of
national power, may be contrasted with the decision in
Panama Refining Company v. Ryan,' in which an attempted delegation of power from the Congress to the
U. S. v. Bush & Co., 310 U. S. 371, 60 S. Ct. 944, 84 L. Ed. 1259 (1940).
Supra, n. 2; see The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, supra,
n. 2 (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 1, 11-17.
6
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President to prevent the transportation of "hot oil" in
interstate commerce was held invalid. In all three of the
cases, the President was charged with the duty and authority merely to put a general policy laid down by the Congress into operation upon the happening of certain previous events. The nature of the subject-matters involved
in the three decisions, however, differed greatly. The "hot
oil" act in the Panama Refining case was a regulation of
the flow of goods in interstate commerce. The Chaco
resolution, on the other hand, involved the exercise of the
national will in its sovereign capacity, through the conduct
of our foreign relations. The provisions of the Tariff Act
before the Court in the Bush case affected both our foreign
trade and our domestic economy.
There is also a considerable difference in the nature
of the functions of the President in the three situations.
The President, in the first case, was, in effect, regarded as
in himself an administrative agency for the regulation of
the subject matter involved, and the act was held invalid
because the discretion entrusted to him in that capacity
was not canalized by the laying down of reasonably adequate standards. In the second case, the real function of
the President was that of the Chief Executive, to whom,
even without action of Congress, the Constitution entrusts
great powers over our foreign relationships. "In this vast
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."'
The
opinion, however, further attempts to distinguish delegation to the President from Congressional delegation to
others, on the ground that in foreign relationships the
President has, through the State Department, access to
confidential information often not available to the Congress
itself, an argument which seems to prove too much, for
there is no reason why an expert commission or executive
officer, other than the President, could not acquire the
same type of information. In the third case, the delega299 U. S. 304, 319, 57 S. Ct. 216, 220, 81 L. Ed. 255, 262 (1936).
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tion of authority was in substance, to an independent administrative body, the Tariff Commission, which operates
in a manner usual in administrative law, but whose determinations cannot be effective unless approved by the
President. Here the President acted only as an additional
check upon an administrative body to whom most of the
delegation of power had been entrusted.
Again, there were substantial differences in the relationships of the Government and the persons affected by
the governmental acts. The refining companies in the "hot
oil" case were engaged in the ordinarily lawful business of
transporting a basic commodity in interstate commerce.
That right can be regulated or curtailed by governmental
authority if properly exercised, but the constitutionality
of the regulation and of the means by which the regulation
is to be made effective can be attacked by any one directly
affected. The makers and sellers of munitions for warring
South American countries, however, are in quite another
category, for they, like the rest of us, are political subjects
and bound by the actions which our Government, in its
capacity as sovereign, takes in the realm of international
affairs. There is involved here no question of domestic
economy, no ordinary and usual rights to transact interstate business within the confines of the United States, but
rather the necessarily great powers which the Federal
Government must have in its dealings with other nations
of the world. Similarly, the well-established doctrine that
no one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing
tariff rate or duty 8 is a recognition of the fact that tariffmaking is an extension of the legislative power 9 in a field
of constantly changing internal and external conditions
where individual interests cannot be allowed to accrue
against action believed to be for the national good.
The historical backgrounds of the actions involved in
the three cases are also dissimilar. There is a long and
I Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S., 288 U. S. 294, 53 S. Ct. 350,
77 L. Ed. 796 (1933).
9 See BLACHLY AND OATMAN, FEDERAL REGULATORY ACTION AND CONTROL
(1940) 67.
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unbroken chain of legislative action similar to the kinds of
delegation involved in the Curtiss-Wright and Bush cases.
In contrast, the form of delegation before the Court in the
"hot oil" case, while not unprecedented, was the kind of
delegation more generally given to administrative bodies
or commissions. The legislation there involved and the
executive action taken in pursuance of it bore evidence
of the stress and confusion of a time of national crisis, and
the defects which the Court found were easily susceptible
of cure by remedial legislation.
Yet, despite these essential differences between the
Curtiss-Wright and Bush cases, on the one hand, and the
Ryan case, on the other, the two former decisions seem to
mark a withdrawal, if not from the narrow precedent of
the Ryan case, at least from some of the broad language
of that decision. Clearly, the effect of the two former
cases is to make more certain the right of Congress to delegate certain functions to the President-a result which
may be of tremendous importance in the present crisis.
There is a further contrast between the decisions of
the Court in the Panama Refining case and the Bush case.
In the former, Justice Cardozo, in his dissent, was of the
opinion that the presumption of the validity of executive
action should apply to the President's proclamation, but
the majority opinion held it to be one of the deficiencies
of the proceedings before it that the President had not
made a finding of fact. By the decision of the majority,
the President, in the capacity in which he was serving
under the statute, was regarded as performing a function
essentially administrative in nature, so that his actions
were judged by the criteria usually applicable to the validity of administrative proceedings rather than those governing the action of public officials in their executive
capacity. In the Bush case, however, Mr. Justice Douglas,
who delivered the opinion of the majority of the Court, 10
stated that:
10

Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented.
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"... where Congress has authorized a public officer to take some specified legislative action when in
his judgment that action is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the policy of Congress, the judgment of
the officer as to the existence of the facts calling for
that action is not subject to review."'"
This is the very doctrine which Justice Cardozo, as a
minority of one, thought should govern on the corresponding point in the Panama case. It is suggested that the essential difference between the two cases is that, in the
tariff decision, the essential administrative function was
carried out by the Tariff Commission, an administrative
board, whereas, in the Panama case, the entire delegation
was to the President alone. The Presidential action in
accepting or rejecting the recommendation of the Tariff
Commission is more executive than administrative in
nature, and, therefore, the doctrine of those cases which
assume the validity of the action of executive officials
seems entirely applicable.
DELEGATION TO BUSINESS

The decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to
Schechter v. U. S.2 make it clear that, in holding the National Industrial Recovery Act was an improper delegation
of Congressional authority to private industry, the Court
did not erect any barrier against a proper cooperation between government and business. 13 Under the N.R.A., the
codes were to be administered by advisory committees
selected by trade associations and members of the industry.
The functions of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Administrator for Industrial Recovery, once the code authority had been established, were largely perfunctory. The
Act presented a situation, therefore, where, in reality,
Congress had entrusted the carrying out of its general
policies almost entirely to representatives of private business rather than to governmental bodies and experts. Four
11310 U. S. 371, 380, 60 S. Ct. 944, 946, 84 L. Ed. 1259, 1262 (1940).

"295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1934).
" See The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, supra. n. 2, 37 Col.
L. Rev. 1, 18-22.
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decisions in the last few years 4 show that the Schechter
case on this point goes no farther than to prevent Congressional abdication.
Currin v. Wallace" involved the constitutionality of
the Tobacco Inspection Act. Under that Act, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to designate tobacco
markets, but he is not to designate a market unless twothirds of the growers voting at a prescribed referendum
favored it. The Court in its majority opinion, delivered by
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, 1" held that this provision of the
Act does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. Congress had not attempted to abdicate
in favor of private business, but, on the contrary, had laid
down its policy and entrusted the carrying out of it to the
Secretary of Agriculture under proper administrative safeguards, and had merely placed a restriction upon its own
regulation by giving a certain proportion of the growers
voting at the referendum power to prevent its operation.
It is true that this provision of the Act amounts to
giving a private industry a veto power over one of the
functions which the Secretary of Agriculture is to perform,
but this veto power is to be regarded in the light of the
particular situation presented. The veto does not apply to
the broader functions of the Secretary of Agriculture as to
investigation and establishment of standards, but has reference only to the specific act of the designation of markets.
A part of the purpose of such designation is to assist the
growers of tobacco, and their approval of the selection of a
particular market seems therefore properly required.
That this decision does not necessarily sanction the
giving of an unrestricted right to industry to repeal administrative actions taken for the effectuation of a general
policy is indicated in the case of Highland Farms Dairy,
"ICurrin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83 L. Ed. 441 (1939):
U. S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446
(1939) ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939) ;
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60 S. Ct. 907, 84
L. Ed. 1263 (1940).
15Supra, n. 14.
' Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented.
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Inc., v. Agnew. 17 In that case there was involved the
validity of a Virginia statute establishing a milk commission. One of the grounds for the attack on the constitutionality of the Act was that it provided for the cancellation of the prices established by the Commission for a
market, if cancellation were requested by a majority of
the producers and distributors in the area affected. It was
argued that the effect of that provision was to vest in
private industry a power of repeal to be exercised at its
pleasure. The majority opinion, in upholding the constitutionality of the Act, refused to pass upon this question
because the power of cancellation had not been exercised
or even threatened. In delivering the majority opinion,
however, Justice Cardozo said:
"Delegation to official agencies is one thing, there
being nothing in the concept of due process to require
that a particular agency shall have a monopoly of
power; delegation to private interests or unofficial
groups with arbitrary capacity to make their will prevail as law may be something very different."'
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act provides,
among other things, that an order of the Secretary of
Agriculture fixing minimum prices for milk under certain
conditions shall only become effective if its issuance is
approved by a certain proportion of the interested producers. The Court, in the Rock Royal case, overruled the
objection that this was an unlawful delegation to producers
of the legislative power to put an order into effect. Mr.
Justice Reed, in delivering the opinion of the Court, 9 said:
"In considering this question, we must assume that
the Congress had the power to put this Order into
effect without the approval of anyone. Whether producer approval by election is necessary or not, a question we reserve, a requirement of such approval would
not be an invalid delegation.""0
"300
"300
"Mr.
-0307

U. S. 608, 57 S. Ct. 549, 81 L. Ed. 835 (1937).
U. S. 608, 614, 57 S. Ct. 549, 552, 81 L. Ed. 835, 841 (1937).
Justice MeReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented.
U. S. 533, 577-578, 59 S. Ct. 993, 1015, 83 L. Ed. 1446, 1472 (1939).
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The partnership between an administrative official and
a private industry under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act is similar in form to that in the designation of tobacco markets. In substance, however, it goes
further, for it makes the approval of industry a condition
to the exercise of one of the vital functions entrusted to
the Secretary of Agriculture, that of providing for minimum prices when such a provision can not be worked out
by voluntary cooperation. The veto of an order establishing a minimum price is more far-reaching than the veto
of the designation of a particular market, for the latter
involves only a geographical choice, while the former involves a broad legislative policy. Yet even the power to
prevent the establishment of a minimum price does not go
as far as the power to repeal such a price after it has been
fixed; there is a substantive difference as well as a theoretical distinction between the operation of a condition
precedent and the revocation of a completed legislative act.
The result of the Rock Royal case seems sound, although
there may not be agreement with the Court's language
above quoted. To argue that, because Congress has the
power to put an order into effect without the approval of
the industry concerned, it can make its regulation effective
upon the condition of such an approval, seems to disregard
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The majority
opinion on this point in the Cartercase 2 rests largely upon
the ground that approval of an industry is such an unconstitutional condition. It seems unnecessary to overrule
that doctrine, which certainly has considerable force, for
the Rock Royal decision can be rested upon the reasonableness of giving industry some part in the administrative
mechanism while confining the actual moving force to the
governmental agency.
A still different kind of partnership between a governmental official acting in an administrative capacity and the
private industry affected was presented to the Court in
See Jaffe, Law
21298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
Making by Private Groups (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1; and The Supreme
Court and Administrative Law, supra, n. 2, 22-26.
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Mulford v. Smith.22 That case involved the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 with respect to providing marketing quotas for flue-cured tobacco.
The Act provides for the apportionment of the state allotment among the farms which previously produced tobacco
as well as to new tobacco farms. The quota among individual farms is to be fixed by local committees of farmers
according to standards prescribed in the Act, amplified by
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture. A farmer
dissatisfied with his allotment is given the right to have
his quota reviewed by a local review committee, and there
is further provision for judicial review. The constitutionality of the Act on the point involved was sustained by a
majority of the Court. 2 Here, the delegation to private
industry is of a detail of administration which can best be
handled locally by those familiar with the conditions of
their neighborhood. The local committees of farmers,
moreover, are, in effect, made administrative bodies in
themselves, and there is provision for administrative and
judicial review.
Just as the conglomeration of functions thrust upon the
code authorities under the N.R.A., as a result of the
Schechter case, have been distributed among properly constituted administrative agencies, without stultification of
any national policy, 24 so the hybrid provisions of the original Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, some of which
were declared unconstitutional in the Carter case, have
been clarified in the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. The
" Supra, n. 14.
Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented.
21 The Fair Labor Standards Act has created a new administrative
agency within the Department of Labor for the administration of the wage
and hour provisions, and has given the Chief of the Childrens Bureau administrative functions for the enforcement of the child labor provisions.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and the Bituminous Coal Act
provide for the fixing of maximum and minimum prices by governmental
agencies. The National Labor Relations Board is entrusted with greater
power to protect the right of collective bargaining than Section 7 A of the
N.R.A. ever gave. Even the sick chickens which were the subject matter
of the Schechter case are now dealt with by the Packers and Stockyards
Administration in the Department of Agriculture. Act of August 14,
1935, c. 532, 49 Stat. 648, Title 7, U. S. C. A. secs. 218 et seq. The fair
trade provisions of the old codes have not been resuscitated, but there
apparently has been a change in national policy with respect to the antitrust laws.
23
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new Act provides for regulation of the sale of bituminous
coal by the Bituminous Coal Commission, an administrative body organized in an accepted form. The coal producers accepting membership are to be organized under
the Bituminous Coal Code; provision is made for a district
board of code members to act as an aid to the Commission
but subject to its authority. The Commission is empowered to fix minimum prices for code members in accordance with stated standards. Each board is to propose
minimum prices, which are to be approved, disapproved or
modified by the Commission as the basis for the coordination of minimum prices. The new Act was declared con25
stitutional in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins.
The opinion of the majority, delivered by Mr. Justice
Douglas, 26 expressly held that there was no improper delegation of legislative authority to industry. Industry's part
in the price-fixing machinery here is that of initiation, not
termination. The code authority suggests, but the administrative authority acts. The function of industry is
more than advisory, for action cannot be completed until
the code authorities perform their functions, but the act
itself and the responsibility for it is that of the governmental agency.
Perhaps the chief significance of these cases lies in the
variations in administrative structure which the Court has
upheld. It is a sign of legislative and judicial statesmanship that there has been no attempt to lay down a norm
of division of functions between administrative boards or
officials and private industries. The Court, in the
Schechter case, only put a ceiling to experimentation along
this line. That ceiling has proved, not a handicap, but a
stimulus to administrative architectonics.
STANDARDS

In a number of cases, the Court had occasion to pass
upon the question of whether or not a Federal or State
statute provided a reasonably clear standard to govern
25 Supra, n. 14.
21 Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented.
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the discretion of an administrative body or official to whom
the carrying out of the legislative policy had been delegated. In each of these cases it was found that the standards were sufficient.
The subject matters involved in these decisions include
the granting or withholding of licenses to broadcasting
stations;" the processes whereby minimum and maximum
prices are to be prescribed for bituminous coal; 2 fixing of
rates for a state public utility;29 the establishment of
market areas and the fixing of minimum prices for milk
under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act;30 the
granting or withholding of licenses to distributors by a
state milk commissioner; 31 the fixing of a quota for the
production of tobacco and its apportionment among the
1
farmers ;3
2 the prohibition of the sale of munitions to warring South American countries; 3 and the determination
of what constitutes an interurban railway by the Interstate
34
Commerce Commission.
The standards laid down for the carrying out of these
different determinations presented a wide range of particularization. The banks within which the discretion of
the President must be canalized in determining whether or
not to apply a prohibition of the sale of munitions must
necessarily be far less circumscribed than the boundaries
for the action of an administrative commission in determining the minimum and maximum prices for an industry.
In the one case, the President is acting not only as an arm
of the Congress, but also in his own capacity as the representative of the nation in the conduct of foreign affairs.
In the other case, there is involved the regulation of a
", Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Company, 309 U. S. 134, 60 S. Ct. 437, 84 L. Ed. 656 (1940).
21Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company v. Adkins, 8upra, n. 14.
29 Texarkana v. Arkansas, Louisiana Gas Co., 306 U. S. 188, 59 S. Ct. 448,
83 L. Ed. 598 (1939).
30 U. S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., supra, n. 14.
"Highland Farms Dairy, Inc., v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 57 S. Ct. 549,
81 L. Ed. 835 (1937).
32 Mulford v. Smith, supra, n. 14.
38U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct.
216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936).
14 Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad
Company, 305 U. S. 177, 59
S. Ct. 160, 83 L. Ed. 111 (1938).
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turbulent industry whose history, in the striking phrase of
Mr. Justice Douglas, is written "in blood as well as in
ink"."5 The breadth of discretion entrusted to the President is supported by a long line of unchallenged legislative
enactments; the specificity of the standards in the other
case is the product of the conflicting forces within the industry as well as of the decision of the Supreme Court on
the former abortive statute. 6
There are substantial differences in the nature of the
individual interests affected by administrative actions
which, in themselves, may play their part in judicial review. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act affects
the doing of business in economic fields only recently subject to Federal regulation, where the private interests are
strong and diversified. The Act was drawn with due regard to the signposts erected by the Schechter decision.
"Unlike the language of the National Industrial Recovery Act condemned in the Schechter case . . ., the
tests here to determine the purpose and the powers
dependent upon that conclusion are defined. In the
Recovery Act the Declaration of Policy was couched
in most general terms. In this Act it is to restore
parity prices, §2. Under the Recovery Act, general
welfare might be sought through codes of any industry, formulated to express standards of fair competition for the businesses covered. Here the terms
of orders are limited to the specific provisions, minutely set out in 8 c (5) and (7). While considerable
flexibility is provided by 8 (c) (7) (D), it gives opportunity only to include provisions auxiliary to those
definitely specified." 3
In the Agnew case, however, which happened to involve the same particular subject of milk regulation, it
was held that the Virginia statute was not invalid for failing to prescribe any standards to be applied by the Commission in granting or refusing licenses to distributors and
35 310

U. S. 381, 395, 60 S. Ct. 907, 913, 84 L. Ed. 1263, 1272 (1940).
0 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160
(1936).
37307 U. S. 533, 575, 576, 59 S. Ct. 993, 1013, 1014, 83 L. Ed. 1446, 1471

(1938).
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producers. The obvious purpose of the license was merely
to provide the Commission with a record to aid in supervision and enforcement. This specific phase of the legislation did not of itself affect the doing of business.
The Pottsville Broadcasting case also involved the
granting or withholding of a license, although here the
economic interests affected by the administrative action
were far more substantial than in the Agnew case. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
pointed out that what was involved was a system of permits for short periods of time
"to protect the national interest involved in the new
and far-reaching science of broadcasting. . . . The
Communications Act is not designed primarily as a
new code for the adjustment of conflicting private
rights through adjudication. Rather it expresses a
desire on the part of Congress to maintain, through
appropriate administrative control, a' 38 grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission.
The independence and expertness of the administrative
agency to which the discretion is entrusted may, of themselves, be intangible elements in these decisions. The Interstate Commerce Commission, with its long handling of
problems in its specialized field, is peculiarly equipped to
weigh the distinguishing factual characteristics which must
determine whether a railroad company is "interurban"
for the purpose of the Railway Labor Act. The "touchstone" of "public convenience, interest, or necessity" for
the exercise of the authority of the Federal Communications Commission, while "as concrete as the complicated
factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority
permit, . . . serves as a supple instrument for the exercise
of discretion by the expert body which Congress has
39
charged to carry out its legislative policy.
The policies to be carried out by a single administrative
organization may so vary in nature as to warrant different
degrees of canalization of discretion. The decision of the
"309 U. S. 134, 137, 138, 60 S. Ct. 437, 439, 84 L. Ed. 656, 659 (1940).
"309 U. S. 134, 138, 60 S. Ct. 437, 439, 84 L. Ed. 656, 659 (1940).
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Secretary of Agriculture that regulation of tobacco marketing is advisable for any particular year is to be determined
by readily ascertainable factual criteria, but the determination of the quota among the states is necessarily based
on intangibles, such as production trends or abnormal producing conditions, as well as upon concrete facts such as
past output.
In all these cases, the Court evinces its awareness of
the amazing variation in the problems of regulation which
modern economic life produces. It is properly loath to declare invalid any delegation to Federal or State administrative bodies where the Legislature has seriously attempted to prescribe standards sufficiently definite under
the circumstances to give fair protection to those regulated
without impairing the efficiency of the regulatory process.
Here, as in other phases of administrative law, the Supreme Court has shown its function to be that of a surveyor
of the administrative structure, not its builder.
THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE AND HEARING

The constitutional safeguard, under both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, of notice and hearing in administrative proceedings affecting specific individual rights has
been so consistently made clear by the Supreme Court in
the past that recent legislation generally contains such
provisions as one of its most salient characteristics. The
Court, in reviewing the processes of administrative agencies, has emphasized the importance of these requirements. 0
The giving of notice and the opportunity to attend a
hearing are not necessary as a matter of due process of law
in an action taken by a clearly legislative body, even
though they might be necessary were the power to take the
same action entrusted to an administrative board. While
4 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1, 46, 47, 57 S. Ct. 615, 628, 629, 81 L. Ed. 893, 916, 917 (1937), and
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 49, 58 S. Ct. 459, 462,
82 L. Ed. 638, 643 (1938) (dealing with the National Labor Relations Act) ;
Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S.
388, 393, 58 S. Ct. 334, 337, 82 L. Ed. 319, 322 (1938) (dealing with a rate
order of a state railroad commission).
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the result may be the same, additional safeguards are held
called for when the action is carried out as part of a delegated function by a body other than one of the three
primary parts of government." Notice and hearing are
not constitutionally necessary as to persons or corporations
against whom the order of an administrative body does
not run, even though they may be affected by it.4 2 Although an act establishing an administrative procedure
makes no specific provision for the opportunity of notice
and attendance at a hearing, it will be assumed that those
requirements will be complied with unless the contrary is
proved.4 3
Where the administrative action was in the nature of
a police regulation to prevent the sale of cosmetics which a
State Commissioner and Director of Public Health believed
would be injurious, and where there was a provision for
" Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 306 U. S. 459,
464, 59 S. Ct. 622, 624, 83 L. Ed. 921, 926 (1939). See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 451, 57 S. Ct. 842, 847, 81 L. Ed. 1210, 1218 (1937);
and Clark v. Gray, 306 U. S. 583, 594, 59 S. Ct. 744, 750, 83 L. Ed. 1001,
1010
(1939).
12 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,

Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 271, 58 S. Ct. 571, 578, 82 L. Ed. 831, 837 (1938), holding
that the National Labor Relations Board does not have to notify an employees' association of a proposed hearing on a charge that the employer
had created and fostered the organization and dominated its administration, and that the presence of that association at the hearing is not
necessary in order to enable the board to determine whether the employer
has violated the statute or to make an appropriate order against the employer. Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.
305 U. S. 197, 232, 233, 59 S. Ct. 206, 218, 219, 83 L. Ed. 126, 141, 142
(1938), holding that the board had no authority to invalidate the contracts
of independent labor unions without notice and hearing to them. In
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350,
60 S. Ct. 569, 84 L. Ed. 799 (1940), the Court held the Board had authority
to order an employer not to enforce contracts with its individual employees
found to have been procured in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act and to have contained provisions violating that Act, even though the
employees were not parties to the proceedings. While no court can make
a binding adjudication of rights in personam if the party Is not brought
before it by due process of law, the Board was here only asserting a public
right vested in it as an administrative body. Its order ran only against
the employer and did not foreclose the employees from taking any action
to secure an adjudication upon their rights under the contracts. See
(1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 898.
Where the statute under which a board of land commissioners was created to pass upon the status of Mexican grants upon the annexation of
California did not require adversary proceedings, notice to other parties
was not essential for the validity of its action. U. S. v. O'Donnell, 303
U. S. 501, 524, 58 S. Ct. 708, 720, 82 L. Ed. 980, 993 (1938).
13 Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 356, 357, 57 S. Ct.
816, 825, 81 L. Ed. 1143, 1155, 1156 (1937).
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court review from refusal to issue a certificate of registration, it was held that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require that there must be a hearing of the applicant
before the Department exercises its judgment." Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in delivering the opinion, called attention
to the circumstances and the character of the action involved. If health may be jeopardized unless administrative action is quickly taken, the paramount consideration
of public safety justifies the waiving of the usual requirements as to notice, particularly where the individual rights
are safeguarded by the opportunity of court appeal.
It is interesting to note how far both recent legislation
and administrative practice go in making provision for
notice and hearing, even where those provisions may not
be necessary as a matter of constitutional law. Fairness
in administrative functioning goes beyond the observance
of constitutional mandates. Moreover, even though the
action of the board may be legislative in nature, the opportunity of those affected to express their views is a salutary
safeguard, tending to promote the efficiency of the regulatory process and to secure acquiescence in its ultimate decision."5 The extent to which notice of proposed action
substantially legislative in nature and opportunity to be
present at the hearing is given by Federal administrative
agencies, whether because of statute or because of regulations of the administrative bodies themselves, is set forth
in detail in the Monographs published by the Attorney
46
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.
4Bouriois v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183, 57 S. Ct. 691, 81 L. Ed. 1027

(1937).
" See U. S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 546, 547, 576,
59 S. Ct. 993, 1000, 1001, 1014, 83 L. Ed. 1446, 1455, 1456, 1471 (1939). Cf.
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Board of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 36 S. Ct.
141, 60 L. Ed. 372 (1915).
4" Those Monographs dealing with the practices and procedures of the

Division of Public Contracts, Department of Labor; the Veterans' Administration; the Federal Communications Commission; the United States
Maritime Commission; the Federal Alcohol Administration; the Federal
Trade Commission; the Administration of the Grain Standards Act, Department of Agriculture; the Railroad Retirement Board; the Federal
Reserve System; the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, Department of Commerce; the Administration of the Packers and Stockyards Act.
Department of Agriculture; the Post Office Department; the Bureau of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury Department: and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. have been published under the general title
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RF UISITES OF A FAIR HEARING

The Court has continued to clarify the essentials of
what constitutes a fair hearing in administrative procedure. Administrative law, with its kaleidoscopic variations in economic background and with its constant balancing of the public and private interests involved, necessarily has few absolutes. One of those few is the doctrine
that, in adversary proceedings on specific issues between
definite parties, the hearing must observe the elements of
fair play. Fair play in such a hearing is not a matter of
definition, but of the application of long recognized principles of justice to the different types of actual situations
presented.
The cases of U. S. v. Morgan47 present a series of decisions which, while between the same parties, have had farreaching effects in the whole field of administrative law.
Through the dramatic fortuity characteristic of our legal
system, the Court has been able in the course of this litigation both to buttress the protection which must be accorded to individual parties and, at the same time, to promote the cooperation between courts and administrative
agencies without which the whole governmental process
would be seriously handicapped.
It is probable that no decisions in administrative law

have had more far-reaching effects on the workings of
administrative agencies than the first two Morgan cases.
Each opinion immediately caused a number of important
alterations in the procedure of boards, commissions and departments dealing with adversary situations, and, while

the full extent of the decisions is not yet entirely clear, the
process of self-examination within the agencies which they
brought about is still going on.
of "Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies".

Senate Document

No. 186, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, in thirteen parts, Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C., 1940.
47 Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. Ed. 1288 (1936);
Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. Ed. 1129 (1938), petition
for rehearing denied 304 U. S. 23, 58 S. Ct. 999, 82 L. Ed. 1135 (1938);
U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 59 S. Ct. 795, 83 L. Ed. 1211 (1939). For
a discussion of the first Morgan case, see The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, supra, n. 2, 37 Col. L. Rev. 1, 33-36.
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The second Morgan case, like the first, presented the
question of the validity of an order of the Secretary of
Agriculture fixing maximum rates to be charged by market
agencies under the Packers and Stockyards Act. As in the
first case, the question was whether the Secretary's order
had been made without a proper hearing. The original
proceedings as to the reasonableness of the charges of the
appellants for stockyards services had been begun by the
Secretary of his own motion. Evidence on the original
hearing and on the rehearing had been taken from time to
time over a two year period. There were about ten thousand pages of transcript of oral evidence and over one
thousand pages of statistical exhibits. Apart from what
was said at the sketchy oral argument, the Government
formulated no issues and furnished the appellants no statement or summary of its contentions and no proposed findings. The appellants' request that the examiner prepare
a tentative report was refused. Instead, findings were
prepared in the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture, whose representatives had conducted
the proceedings for the Government. There were one hundred and eighty findings, which dealt in detail with various
phases of the economic problems presented by the Kansas
City Live Stock Market as well as the general and specific
ways the appellants conducted their business. These findings were submitted to the Secretary, who signed them
with only a few changes in the rates suggested.
The Court held that this procedure did not constitute
a fair and open hearing:
"The right to a hearing embraces not only the right
to present evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity
to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet
them .... Those who are brought into contest with
the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed
at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly
advised of what the Government proposes and to be
heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command. 4 8
48

304 U. S. 1, 18, 19, 58 S. Ct. 773, 776. 82 L. Ed. 1129, 1132, 1133 (1938).
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Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in delivering the opinion of
the Court,49 emphasized that the doctrine laid down related
to substance and not form. While it is good practice to
have the examiner prepare a report as a basis for exceptions and argument, that particular type of procedure is
not essential. What matters is whether the parties against
whom specific action is proposed to be taken know what
that action is proposed to be; the manner in which knowledge of the issues is brought home to them is immaterial.
The Court made it clear that it was not attempting to make
any form of notice and procedure mandatory in all administrative proceedings. It was the complicated nature of
the issues and the multiplicity of findings in the second
Morgan case which made notice essential.
The non-technical nature of that decision is made all
the clearer by the Mackay Radio case,5 0 decided in the same
term. The Company was summoned by the Board to answer a complaint that it discriminated by discharging five
men. After evidence had been taken, the complaint was
withdrawn and a new one presented based on its refusal
to reemploy any of these men. When the Board made its
findings, it reverted to its original position that what the
Company did was not a failure to reemploy, but a wrongful
discharge. The Company claimed that it was found guilty
of an unfair labor practice which was not within the issues
upon which the case was tried. The Court overruled this
contention characterizing the Company's position as:
"... highly technical. All parties to the proceeding knew from the outset that the thing complained of
was discrimination against certain men by reason of
their alleged union activities."'"
The form of the proceeding may have been technically
defective, but the Company, at every stage, knew of the
real substantive issue involved. The Mackay case makes
,9Mr. Justice Black dissented. Mr. Justice Cardozo and Mr. Justice
Reed took no part in the consideration and decision.
50National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
304 U. S. 333, 58 S. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381 (1938).
6 304 U. S. 333, 349, 58 S. Ct. 904, 912, 82 L. Ed. 1381, 1392 (1938).
Cf.
National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 346, 59
S. Ct. 508, 515, 83 L. Ed. 682, 691 (1939).
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clear by way of decision what the Court, in the Morgan
case, made clear by way of language. The Court is the
guardian of substantive individual rights in administrative
proceedings as well as in every other field of the law, but
that guardianship is not to be construed as an obstructive
insistence upon the observance of technicalities to delay
52
the workings of the administrative process.
There is an additional overtone in the second Morgan
case, whose full implications are yet to be realized-the
advisability of the separation of functions within the organization in adversary proceedings, where the administration is acting in a dual capacity, such as prosecutor and
judge. To accomplish that separation, as some Federal
agencies are showing, it is not necessary to withdraw
functions from the agency; the full spirit of fair play can
be generally achieved by a division of responsibility within
the agency's personnel. 3
In another case, the Court had occasion to reannounce
the fundamental principle that administrative adversary

11

For an example of the changes in administrative procedure made
advisable by the second Morgan case, see In the Matter of the Petition of
the National Labor Relations Board, 304 U. S. 486, 58 S. Ct. 1001, 82 L. Ed.
1482 (1938). Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 305 U. S. 197, 228, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 216-217, 83 L. Pd. 126, 139, 140
(1938). The extent to which particular administrative processes in the
Federal agencies should be changed, either by reason of the holding in the
second Morgan case or, even though such change may not be necessary as
a matter of constitutional law, to reflect the spirit of fair play, depends
upon a number of factors. Different answers to the problem may well be
proper in different agencies. See the Monograph of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure on the Administration of the
Grain Standards Act, Department of Agriculture, United States Government Printing Office, Senate Document No. 186, 76th Congress, 3rd Session,
pages 18-20 (Washington, 1940).
" For an analysis of the administrative functions within the Department
of Agriculture where such division of responsibility seems called for to
effectuate the spirit of fair play, see Memorandum of the Solicitor of the
Department of Agriculture, dated May 11, 1939, printed in the Monograph
of the Attorney General's Committee on the Administration of the Grain
Standards Act, 22-25. See also the Report of the Committee named by
the Secretary of Labor to study the immigration practice and procedure
and to make such recommendations as it deemed advisable, dated May 17,
1940, at page 80:
"Clearly if the Central Office in a deportation case were to accept
confidential recommendations from a prosecutor-inspector, not disclosed to the alien, the principle of the second Morgan case would be
directly violated. We think the case is not better when the prosecutor-inspector at a primary hearing makes any decision given presumptive weight by the Central Office, and this whether or not the
findings and decision were disclosed to the alien. For in such case,

19411

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

253

orders cannot be based upon facts not appearing on the
record. A commission cannot cut down the value of a
public utility upon the strength of information "secretly
collected and never yet disclosed . . . This is not the fair
hearing essential to due process. It is condemnation without trial." 54
THE POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS OVER

THEIR OWN PROCEDURE
The decisions of the Court show a consistent attitude
that, within certain limits, administrative agencies are to
be left free, in so far as judicial review is concerned, to develop their own procedure. It is for the courts to determine whether the principles of fair play have been observed in adversary proceedings, or whether the particular
board or commission has exceeded the statutory authority
given it, but it is not for them to decide whether the
technique which any of these agencies is developing to
meet its own particular problems is the best possible approach, nor to insist upon the uniform adoption of even
a procedure generally approved. Like the social experimentations in the forty-eight States which are made possible by our Federal system, the variations in both structure and procedure which the administrative organisms
exhibit may be an aid to the evolutionary process.
The recent cases permit more latitude in the form of
findings of fact as a condition precedent to certain types of
administrative action than the Panama Refining case5"
where weight attaches to the decision of an officer who in his own
person combines the functions of prosecutor and judge, mere disclosure of what the findings are is futile as a corrective.
"Whatever may be the conclusions of the courts, which are and
must be hesitant to hold administrative action to be in violation
of the Constitution, there seems to us no question of the duty of
administrative officials themselves by every practicable means to
remove the basis of criticism."
See Stason, Administrative Tribunals-Organizationand Reorganization
(1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 533. 554.
r4 Ohio Bell Telephone
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 301
U. S. 292, 300, 57 S. Ct. 724, 728, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 1099 (1937). Cf. Patterson
v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376, 59 S. Ct. 259, 83 L. Ed. 231 (1939).
55Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed.
446 (1935). See LANDIS, TnE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1933) 148, 149.
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seemed to foreshadow. The findings by the President in
the Curtiss-Wright case,56 affecting future sales of munitions, could hardly have been more general, but their sufficiency was sustained. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, requiring certain carriers to cease and
desist from spotting cars on industrial plant tracks as part
of the services rendered, was upheld upon bare findings
that the carrier service of transportation is complete upon
the delivery to the interchange tracks, and that spotting
within the plants is not included in the services for which
the line-haul rates were fixed. 57 Findings of the Federal
Communications Commission, which were the basis of its
refusal to grant a permit for a radio broadcasting station,
were held sufficient even though they were not "as detailed
upon the subject as might be desirable"." These three
cases, it is to be noted, deal with administrative action
which is predominantly legislative in character, or which
is concerned with the granting or withholding of licenses.
There seems to have been no relaxation in the requirement
of specific findings to support an order quasi-judicial in
nature2 9
The Court continues to uphold the vitally necessary
power of administrative officials to fill in the details of Congressional enactments through the making of proper
rules.6" But the power of amplifying the legislative policy
11 U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81
L. Ed. 255 (1936).
17 U.
S. v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U. S. 402, 406, 407, 57
S. Ct. 804, 806, 807, 81 L. Ed. 1186, 1190, 1191 (1937).
11 Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 477, 60 S. Ct. 693, 698, 84 L. Ed. 869, 875 (1940).
11 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metal Corporation, 306
U. S. 240, 261, 59 S. Ct. 490, 498, 83 L. Ed. 627, 637-8 (1939).
There must
be a request for findings before an administrative board to support the
claim of denial of procedural due process. American Toll Bridge Company
v. Railroad Commission of California, 307 U. S. 486, 492, 493, 59 S. Ct. 948,
951, 952, 83 L. Ed. 1414, 1420, 1421 (1939). It will be presumed that a
hearing complied with all the requirements of procedural due process
unless the contrary is made affirmatively to appear. Anniston Manufacturing Company v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 357, 57 S. Ct. 816, 825, 81 L. Ed.
1143, 1155-6 (1937).
60 Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, 100-103, 60 S. Ct. 18, 24-25,
84 L. Ed. 101, 107-109 (1939) ; Atchison, T. S. F. R. Co. v. Scarlett, 300
U. S. 471, 57 S. Ct. 541, 81 L. Ed. 748 (1937). See Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 252; Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule Making (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 259.
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is far different from an attempt by an administrative board
to waive the carrying out of such a policy.6 ' There can be
administrative amplification, but not administrative repeal.
In the same general way that courts retain control, for
certain periods, of cases which have been heard before
them, so it has been held, through the process of statutory
interpretation, that the National Labor Relations Board can
modify or set aside its order, in whole or in part, at any
time before the filing in Court of a certified transcript of
the record,6" although that authority is ended, as an absolute right, when the record is filed in court.0 3 The Interstate Commerce Commission was held to have the right to
reconsider and set aside its reparation order, although the
originally successful shipper had paid out one-half of the
amount recovered to the expert who represented it, and
recovery of the fee was barred by the statute of limitations;64 the power of the Commission to modify its own
findings in order to effectuate a Congressional policy is
more important than incidental hardship to a private party
prematurely elated.
Even though the Federal Communications Commission
erred in denying a permit to construct a broadcasting station, on a new hearing the Commission can hear other applications for the same facilities and take new evidence,
for the issue involved is one of public convenience, and
private parties can obtain no vested interests against the
public through the Commission's prior error." Conversely,
a board, in controlling its own procedure, cannot, through
61 See U. S. v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 201-208, 225-227,
60 S. Ct. 811, 834-837, 846, 84 L. Ed. 1129, 1156-1160, 1170 (1940).
2In the Matter of the Petition of the National Labor Relations Board,
304 U. S. 486, 58 S. Ct. 1001, 82 L. Ed. 1482 (1938).
11 Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 364, 59
S. Ct. 301, 83 L. Ed. 221 (1939).
6" Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 59 S. Ct. 943, 83
L. Ed. 1409 (1939).
6" Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U. S.
146, 60 S. Ct. 443, 84 L. Ed. 664 (1940).
See also Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U. S. 134, 60 S. Ct. 437, 84 L. Ed. 656 (1940). The National Labor
Relations Board is not precluded from dealing with unfair labor practices
related to those alleged in the original charge and growing out of them,
although the new practices occur while the proceeding is pending before
the Board. National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309
U. S. 350, 367, 60 S. Ct. 569, 578-579, 84 L. Ed. 799, 812 (1940).
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unexpectedly closing the hearing, prejudice a corporation
by refusing to receive the testimony of some of its wit66
nesses.
A rather perplexing situation is presented by the case
of ParaminoLumber Company v. Marshall."' In that case,
it was held that Congress can, by private act, direct a review of an order for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, even after
the Compensation Commission had passed its final award
and after the time for review of the award had expired.
The Court held that the action involved was a curative act
to remedy a mistake in administration where the remedy
could be applied without injustice, but, it is submitted, that
the situation presented is not quite so uncomplicated.
Once that Congress has lawfully delegated its power to an
administrative body in a particular field, does it have the
power to withdraw that delegation as to an action properly
taken by that body within the power delegated to it? Is
there not as strong an argument for finality as to Congressional action, in so far as a past administrative order
is concerned, as there is when the question is raised as to
the scope of judicial review? On the other hand, should
Congress be held by its prior delegation to have stultified
itself from remedying what it believes to be a specific injustice? The decision, to one reader at least, leaves the
answers to such questions in considerable doubt.
THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Probably the most important phase of the decisions of
the Supreme Court during the period here considered is
their clarification of the scope and extent of judicial review
of the workings of the administrative agencies. Judicial
review involves the situations in which the Court will undertake examination of the administrative process as well
as the degree of supervision once review has been granted.
The case of Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305
U. S. 197, 225, 59 S. Ct. 206, 215, 83 L. Ed. 126, 138 (1938).
67 309 U. S. 370, 60 S. Ct. 600, 84 L. Ed. 814 (1940).
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Valley Authority,8 involved actions of the United States
acting, analytically, in its capacity as a proprietor or
owner. But the operations of the T.V.A., in the development of the dams on the Tennessee River and its tributaries, and the sale of power created by the dams, in their
impact upon the large private interests involved and upon
the millions of persons directly affected, come within the
modern concept of administrative law. 9 The Tennessee
Electric Power Company, and a number of other corporations carrying on business in the area involved filed a bill
to enjoin the T.V.A. from carrying out its plan of generating and selling electricity, on the ground that the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Roberts,"0 held that the bill had been properly dismissed
by the lower court. The ground of the decision was that,
irrespective of the amount of the damage which the proposed activities of the T.V.A. would admittedly inflict upon
the utility companies, that damage would not result from
the violation of any right recognized by law. Not even
the constitutionality of the statute under which a governmental agency is carrying out its functions can be challenged by any one "unless the right invaded is a legal
right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a
statute which confers a privilege."' 71 The private utilities
had no monopoly, no contractual or property rights to be
free of competition either from individuals or government.
The same principle was followed by the Court in the
case of Perkins v. Lukens Steel Company.7 2 Under the
Public Contracts Act of 1936, sellers must agree to pay employees engaged in producing goods purchased for government supplies not less than certain minimum wages to be
6'306 U. S. 118, 59 S. Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543 (1939).
See (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 4, n. 16.
°Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented. Mr. Justice
Reed took no part in the consideration of the case.
'- 306 U. S. 118, 137, 59 S. Ct. 366, 369, 83 L. Ed. 543, 549 (1939). See
also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488, 43 S. Ct. 597, 601, 67 L.
Ed. 1078, 1085 (1923).
'310 U. S. 113, 60 S. Ct. 869, 84 L. Ed. 1108 (1940). Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented.
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determined by the Secretary of Labor as the prevailing
minimum wages in the locality in which the supplies are
to be manufactured. Individual iron and steel manufacturers obtained an injunction against six members of the
Cabinet from observing the minimum wage determined by
the Secretary of Labor under the Act, on the ground that
the Secretary had erroneously construed the term "locality" for the iron and steel industry. The Court, in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, held that the respondents had not shown such
an injury or threat to particular rights of their own, as distinguished from the public interest in the administration
of the law, to have a standing to sue. Mr. Justice Black, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"Judicial restraint of those who administer the
Government's purchasing would constitute a break
with settled judicial practice and a departure into
fields hitherto wisely and happily apportioned by the
genius of our policy to the administration of another
branch of Government....
"The record here discloses the 'confusion and disorder' that can result from the delays necessarily incident to judicial supervision of administrative procedure developed to meet present day needs of Government and capable of operating efficiently
and fairly
'7 3
to both private and public interests.
Both of these cases involved actions of administrative
agencies of the Government acting in its proprietary
capacity. A cognate decision, in a broader field of administrative law, is the case of Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station.7 ' The Court
held that, in passing upon an application for a broadcasting
license, resulting economic injury to a rival station is not
of itself, apart from considerations of public convenience,
interest or necessity, an element which the Federal Communications Commission must weigh or as to which it
must make findings. Licenses under the Act are not in the
Is 310 U. S. 113, 127, 128, 130, 131, 60 S. Ct. 869, 876, 877, 878, 878-9, 84
L. Ed. 1108, 1114-5, 1115, 1116, 1117 (1940).
71 309 U. S. 470, 0 S. Ct. 693, 84 L. Ed. 869 (1940).
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nature of property rights; the purpose of the legislation
is not to protect licensees against competition but to protect the public.7 5
Further light is cast upon the right to judicial review
by a series of decisions in which the protestants admittedly
had legal standing, but in which the question was whether
there was such irreparable injury as to justify the granting
of an injunction. It has long been established that no one
is entitled to judicial relief against a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy
has been exhausted. 76 The Court held that, under this
principle, equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the National
Labor Relations Board from proceeding, even where it is
contended that the Board lacks power over the subject
matter because it does not involve interstate commerce.7 7
"Obviously, the rule requiring exhaustion of the
administrative remedy cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the complaint rests
is groundless and that the mere holding of the prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable damage. Lawsuits also often prove to have been
groundless; but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant
from the necessity of a trial to estab7T
lish the fact.
An investigation by a state public service commission
of wholesale rates for gas was held not to be enjoinable
' Although the Court held that economic injury to the respondent was
not a proper issue before the Commission, it also held that, under the Act,
the respondent had standing to prosecute an appeal. It was within the
power of Congress to determine that "one likely to be financially injured
by the issue of a license would be the only person having a sulffcient
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in
the action of the Commission in granting the license." 310 U. S. 469, 477,
60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 (1940).
76 Decisions of the Supreme Court to this effect during the period here
considered are: Highland Farms Dairy, Inc., v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608,
57 S. Ct. 549, 81 L. Ed. 835 (1937) ; and Bourjois v. Chapman, 301 U. S.
183, 57 S. Ct. 691, 81 L. Ed. 1027 (1937) ; Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 58 S. Ct. 199, 82 L. Ed. 276 (1937) ; St. Louis, B.
& M. R. Co. v. Brownsville Navigation District, 304 U. S. 295, 58 S. Ct.
868, 82 L. Ed. 1357 (1938).
77 Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459,
82 L. Ed. 638 (1938); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Schaufflier, 303 U. S. 54, 58 S. Ct. 466, 82 L. Ed. 646 (1938).
78Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.. S. 41, 51, 52, 58 S. Ct.
459, 463, 464, 82 L. Ed. 8. 644, 645 (1938).
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in the Federal Court, even though the appellant claimed
that any regulation of the rates charged would be beyond
the statutory power of the commission, when compliance
with the order of the commission would only subject the
appellant to expense in preparing for and carrying out
the investigation.79 The Court balanced the interests involved and decided that the extraordinary powers of injunction should not be here employed to interfere with the
action of the administrative agency. The statute in question contained detailed provisions for hearings and judicial
review, and the compulsory and punitive powers of the
commission could only be exercised through judicial process. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of a petition
to enjoin an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
which only required the appellant to file with the Commission certain maps and schedules for use in valuing its property, even though the order was made after a determination by the Commission that the appellant was a common
carrier within the provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act, which the appellant denied."0 Mr. Justice Reed, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, pointed out that the
data required by the order might never be used to fix rates.
"Publicity alone may give effective remedy to abuses, if
any there be.""' A bill against the Railroad Retirement
Board and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to enjoin
the enforcement of the Railroad Retirement Acts and the
Carriers' Taxing Act on the ground that, as a matter of
statutory construction, the federal system was not applicable to a state railroad, was held without equity, when the
proposed action complained of was only to require the
railroad to gather and keep records of its employees. The
expense of. temporarily complying with the regulation
until the applicability of the Act had been judicially determined was held not to be sufficient to support the irreparable injury indispensable to relief. Any tax claimed by the
"Petroleum Exploration, Inc., v. Public Service Commission of Kentucky, 304 U. S. 209, 58 S. Ct. 834, 82 L. Ed. 1294 (1938).
80Valvoline Oil Co. v. U. S., 308 U. S. 141, 00 S. Ct. 160, 84 L. Ed. 151
(1939).
81308 U. S. 141, 146, 60 S. Ct. 160, 162-3, 84 L. Ed. 151. 154-5 (1939).
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue could, if paid, be recovered, with interest, if ultimately found not to have been
2
due.
On the other hand, the balancing of the interests involved resulted in a holding that there was general equity
jurisdiction to consider a bill to enjoin the enforcement
of a determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the appellant was not an "interurban electric railway", and therefore excepted from the Railway Labor
Act.8" If the determination of the Commission were held
valid (as it was on the merits), disobedience would be immediately punishable through the institution of criminal
proceedings. Moreover, if the railroad were subject to the
Railway Labor Act, it would be excluded from the operation of the National Labor Relations Act, and otherwise
not, so that the railroad could not, without court relief,
determine which agency had jurisdiction over it.
In another case,84 the petitioners were producers of
bituminous coal. The National Bituminous Coal Commission had obtained information from them with respect to
the cost of producing their coal and the prices realized, on
the assurance that the reports would be kept confidential.
This assurance was authorized by the National Bituminous
Coal Act. After the reports had been made on this assurance, the Commission announced that it would give public
notice of a hearing to determine the average of the total
cost of coal for the year in question, and that, upon such
hearing, the information obtained from the individual coal
producers would be made available for inspection and
introduction into evidence. Mr. Justice McReynolds, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, held that the District
Court had jurisdiction over the controversy, and that the
complainants could properly ask for relief in equity because of the great and obvious damage which might be
suffered and the lack of any other remedy, if the informaCalifornia v. Latimer, 305 U. S. 255, 59 S. Ct. 166, 83 L. Ed. 159 (1938).
11Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 59 S. Ct. 160, 83
L. Ed. 111 (1938).
11Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 306 U. S.
56. 59 S. Ct. 409, 83 L. Ed. 483 (1939).
12
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tion which they had supplied were improperly made public. The Court then proceeded to consider the case upon
the merits, and decided that as Congress had adequate
power to authorize the Commission to use the information
and had used language adequate thereto, the bill was properly dismissed, despite the obvious fact that publication of
the reports might be harmful to the petitioners. The public interest tipped the scales in justification of the act of
the Commission, although the private interests involved
weighted them on the other side in determining the right
to ask for injunctive relief.
Another series of cases, arising under the National
Labor Relations Act, emphasizes that there is no constitutional right to a court review of interim phases of an
administrative process, even though the successive steps in
themselves may involve substantive private rights. The
Act was held not to give jurisdiction to Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal to review a certification by the National
Labor Relations Board that a particular labor organization
was a collective bargaining representative of the employees
in a designated unit,86 or a Board direction for a run-off
election, 6 or the exclusion of an alleged company union
from the ballot in an election.87 It is true that none of
these determinations in themselves commanded action,
and that an employer, under the Act, has the right to court
review of an order where he is directed to take action or to
cease an unfair labor practice. Nevertheless, as the Court
stated:
"Administrative determinations which are not commands may for all practical purposes determine rights
as effectively as the judgment of a court, and may be
reexamined by courts under particular statutes providing for the review of 'orders'. ' 8
" American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board,
308 U. S. 401, 60 S. Ct. 300, 84 L. Bd. 347 (1940).
86National Labor Relations Board v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308 U. S. 413, 60 S. Ct. 306, 84 L. Ed. 354 (1940).
17 National Labor
Relations Board v. Falk Corporation, 308 U. S. 453,
60 S. Ct. 307, 84 L. Ed. 396 (1940).
11 American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, 308
U. S. 401, 408, 84 L. Ed. 347, 60 S. Ct. 300 (1940).
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Any hardship which may result from a lack of court review
of a particular step, however, is for Congress, not the
courts, to remedy. There is no infringement of due process
of law in withholding jurisdiction from Federal appellate
courts over such an administrative determination. s9
Nor does the fact that a private party has been incidentally benefited by an administrative order necessarily
give such a party the right to have the order enforced by
judicial process. The National Labor Relations Board had
ordered an employer to desist from certain labor practices
found to be unfair and to take certain affirmative action.
The labor union found to have been discriminated against
applied to the Circuit Court of Appeals to have the company adjudged in contempt for failure to comply with
requirements of the decree. The Supreme Court affirmed
a denial of the motion. 0 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in delivering the Court's opinion, pointed out that the procedure
under the National Labor Relations Act was prescribed
in the public interest as distinguished from statutes intended to afford remedies to private persons, such as the
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in relation
to unjust discrimination. The National Labor Relations
Board is entrusted with the exclusive authority to seek
enforcement of its orders on behalf of the public, and although the carrying out of those orders may result in benefits to a party directly affected, it is for the governmental
agency alone to determine when to seek court redress for
violations. Hardship or benefit to individual parties is immaterial, in so far as court review is concerned, unless
the statute gives them the right to appeal, or unless recognized legal rights are substantially invaded.
s9 See also Shannahan v. U. S., 303 U. S. 596, 603, 82 L. Ed. 1039, 1043,
58 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1938), holding that there was no jurisdiction in a
Federal District Court under the Urgent Deficiencies Act to set aside a
determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission that a particular
railroad is not exempt under the Railway Labor Act, even though the
action of the Commission may not be reviewable by any other judicial
procedure.
90 Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Company of
New York, 309 U. S. 261, 84 L. Ed. 738, 60 S. Ct. 561 (1940).
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THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Probably no case in administrative law has been more
discussed than Rochester Telephone Corporationv. U. S.,9
in which the Court declared that it would no longer treat
the distinction between "negative" and "affirmative" orders
as governing judicial review. If the matter is one in which
ordinarily there would be a right to review, the Court will
no longer abstain merely because the administrative action
is of itself incomplete without further action, or because
the agency has only declined to relieve the plaintiff from a
statutory command, or because the action sought to be
reviewed is attacked on the ground it does not forbid or
compel conduct by a third person. "The considerations of
policy for which the notions of 'negative' and 'affirmative'
orders were introduced, are completely satisfied by proper
application of the combined doctrines of primary jurisdic9' 2
tion and administrative finality.
No useful purpose is to be served by attempting further
to expound either the doctrine which the case announces
or that which it overrules. The decision has, however,
two connotations even more important than its actual
holding.
First, the decision enlarges the scope of judicial review
over the actions of administrative bodies. It is all the
more significant that this extension comes at a time when
the Court's decisions, on the whole, tend to give a greater
degree of finality to administrative determinations. The
Rochester case is an answer to those who claim that the
Court has been retreating from its proper function of maintaining the supremacy of law over the form of government
"l
307 U. S. 125, 146, 83 L. Ed. 1147, 1161, 59 S. Ct. 754, 765 (1939). Mr.
Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler, while concurring in the nmajority opinion, did so because they believed that the order of the Federal
Communications Commission involved was, in substance, an affirmative
one, and that the findings of the District Court were amply sustained by
the evidence. In their opinion, there was no occasion to overrule any
prior decisions of the Court or to repudiate the negative order doctrine.
See Hart, The Buslness of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937
and 1938 (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 617; (1939) 48 Yale L. J. 1257;
(1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1010; (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 379.
02307 U. S. 125, 142, 83 L. Ed. 1147, 1159, 59 S. Ct. 745, 763 (1939).
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carried out through boards and commissions. But it is an
answer which has been made without violation of the basic
principle that the work of administration, if it is to be a
successful instrument of government, must be carried on
by those boards and commissions and not by the courts
themselves.
Second, the case is a heartening example of how justice
can simplify and reframe its own rules. Involved and difficult criteria are discarded, and in their place the Court
now follows a consistent approach to the entire matter of
judicial review. The negative order doctrine was largely
an attempt to formalize the right to court action in administrative matters, but that right must depend on a balancing of specific factors too variable for generalization.
If both the fairness and efficiency of the administrative
process are to be safeguarded, substance and not form
must guide the Court in its decisions.
The scope of judicial review, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words, embraces only "questions affecting constitutional power, statutory authority and the basic prerequisites of proof . . .,93 The question of whether or not an
administrative rule, order or other action is within the confines of the authority delegated by the legislative body,
like the broader question of constitutional interpretation,
is more than a matter of construing the written word. One
of the reasons for the existence of administrative organizations is that the various situations which they are called
upon to resolve cannot be anticipated in the statutory enactment; the process of filling in the details involves both
interstitial interpretation and legislation. Yet all administrative action must be kept within the general intent of
the statutory authorization, otherwise the banks within
which discretion must be canalized might soon disappear
beneath the flood of administrative authority, even if originally they were constructed in accordance with the constitutional mandate of proper standards. No board or commission can, under our system of law, be allowed of itself
307 U. S. 125, 140, 83 L. Ed. 1147, 1158, 59 S. Ct. 745, 762 (1939).
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finally to determine the meaning of the statute which it is
administering. As a result, the final and potent power of
determination must remain in the courts.
Judicial review, in matters of statutory construction,
may involve merely the consideration of a clearly legal
question,94 or it may involve the whole "synthesis of design" 95 in which the administrative agency, the legislature,
and the courts are only units.
In the decisions on statutory construction, as in other
phases of judicial review, there may be reflected the degree
of expertness which the particular administrative organization has shown. Courts cannot fail to be aware of the
general manner in which the different agencies conduct
their affairs, and a more intense scrutiny of the workings
of some agencies may result. More troublesome questions,
also, are apt to arise in connection with the acts of an administrative agency in a new field of regulation than with
respect to agencies longer established.
The conduct of the work of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the oldest Federal administrative agency, resulted, during the period here considered, in a series of
decisions which nicely evidence the degree to which such
an organization can interpret the legislation under which
it acts without judicial curtailment. The determination,
for example, of what is a "bona fide operation" as a common carrier by motor vehicle on a certain date, so as to
exempt it from certain requirements of proof in obtaining
a certificate of public convenience, was held, in two cases
with differing facts, to be primarily for the Commission, in
order that the remedial purposes of the Federal Motor
Carrier Act might be achieved.9 6 There was a similar
"As in Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 320, 58 S. Ct. 886 (1939),
in which a person born in the United States was held entitled to an injunction against the Secretary of Labor from prosecuting proceedings for her
deportation, and against the Secretary of State to require him to issue a
passport, on the ground that, even though taken to another country by
her parents, she had the right to elect retention of her United States citizenship on reaching majority.
" LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1933)
155.
"McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 263, 83 L. FEd. 164, 59 S. Ct. 176
(1938) ; U. 8. v. Maher, 307 U. S. 148, 83 L. Ed. 1162, 59 8. Ct. 768 (1939).
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holding as to a finding by the Commission as to what con97
stitutes a "device" of discrimination between shippers.
In another case, the portion of the Interstate Commerce
Act empowering the Commission to authorize leases which
promote the public interest, subject to such terms and
conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable, was
held to authorize the Commission to require, as a condition
of a lease of one railroad by another, that employees of
the lessor be compensated for the losses sustained by rea98
son of the resulting discharge or transfer.
In contrast, while the National Labor Relations Board
was held to have acted within the statutory discretion
given to it in such matters as an order requiring an employer to withdraw all recognition of a dominated employee organization as the representative of its employees, 9 and a determination that a strike called by a
union because of prolongation of negotiations was a labor
dispute, irrespective of whether or not the strikers were
justified in considering the employer unreasonable,"' in
other important cases, the Board was held to have exceeded its authority. The National Labor Relations Act
does not go so far as to enable the Board to inflict upon the
employer any penalty it may choose because he is engaged
in unfair labor practices, even though the Board is of the
opinion that the general policies of the Act might thereby
be effectuated. 10 In the Fansteel case," 2 the majority of
the Court overruled the Board's contention that the Act
07 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. U. S., 305 U. S. 507, 83 L. Ed.
318, 59 S. Ct. 284 (1939).
"8U. S. v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225, 84 L. Ed. 208, 62 S. Ct. 48 (1939).
90 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 82 L. Ed. 831, 58 S. Ct. 571 (1938).
110National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Corporation, 304 U. S. 333, 82 L. Ed. 1381, 58 S. Ct. 904 (1938).
See also
National Licorice Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S.
350, 84 L. Ed. 799, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940) holding, inter alia, that the Board
is authorized to preclude an employer from taking any benefit of individual
contracts with employees procured in violation of the Act.
101 Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board,
305 U. S. 197, 235, 83 L. Ed. 126, 143, 59 S. Ct. 206, 219 (1938). Mr.
Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Black dissented from the finding that the
Board had exceeded its authority in this respect.
102 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metal Corporation, 306
U. S. 240, 83 L. Ed. 627, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939). Mr. Justice Reed and Mr.
Justice Black dissented.
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authorized it to treat as an unfair labor practice the discharge of employees who had taken part in a sit-down
strike and seized the employer's factory. Nor, the Court
held, does the Act, properly construed, authorize the Board
to treat as an unfair labor practice the failure of an employer to negotiate with employees who had wrongfully
repudiated the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
properly entered into."0 3
One aspect of the decisions on statutory construction
affords an interesting illustration of the fact that, more
and more, courts, legislatures and administrative boards
are being regarded as cooperative rather than antagonistic
agencies in the carrying out of governmental functions. In
the construction of the statutes under which administrative
agencies are functioning, the Court considers the interpretations and regulations of the agencies themselves. An administrative construction of a statute, if permissible, is
"persuasive"; 1O4 a long continued administrative interpretation by the Comptroller of the Treasury is given "decided weight" in reaching a conclusion upon a construction
of a land grant statute;0 5 "Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes,
are deemed to have received congressional approval and
have the effect of law"; 10 6 customs regulations in force
when a Tariff Act was adopted are held incorporated by
103 National
Labor Relations Board v. Sands Manufacturing Company,
306 U. S. 332, 83 L. Ed. 682, 59 S. Ct. 508 (1939).
Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Reed dissented. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
:o0 Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 30, 83 L. Ed. 455, 463, 59 S. Ct. 442.
447 (1939) (dealing with the question of whether a national park administered by the War Department is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States).
105 Southern Pacific Company v. U. S., 307 U. S. 393, 401, 83 L. Ed. 1363,
1368, 59 S. Ct. 923, 928 (1939).
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Roberts dissented; Mr. Justice Douglas took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case. See also Armstrong Paint &
Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corporation, 305 U. S. 315, 331, 83 L. Ed. 195,
204, 59 S. Ct. 191, 199 (1938) (giving weight to the construction by the
Patent
Office of a statutory provision as to trade-marks).
10 Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79, 83, 83 L. Ed. 52, 55, 59 S. Ct. 45.
46 (1938); Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 306 U. S. 110.
116, 83 L. Ed. 536, 541, 59 S. Ct. 423, 426 (1939).
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reference. 10 7 But this doctrine does not go so far as to
give legal effect to a Treasury regulation which is plainly
in conflict with the statute, in so far as its retroactive application is concerned. 08
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT

One of the basic characteristics of an administrative
body is its intimate acquaintance with the facts in the
fields in which it operates and its expertness in dealing
with them. It is well settled that, except in cases of socalled "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" facts, findings
of fact by administrative bodies will not be set aside by the
courts if there is substantial evidence to support them,
even though a court might reach a different conclusion if it
substituted its own for the administrative judgment. The
requirement that there must be substantial evidence to
support the administrative findings of fact is generally set
forth in the governing statutes; if it is not, it is announced
as part of the general doctrine of judicial review. This
doctrine has been applied by the Court, in the period considered, to a number of situations, in which the range of
the different kinds of expertness involved is a cogent argument in support of the doctrine the cases follow. 0 9
107McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 309 U. S. 414, 84 L. Ed. 840, 60
S. Ct. 664 (1940).
See Brown, Regulations, Reenactment and the Revenue
Act (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 377; and Griswold, A Sumnmary of the Regulations Problem (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398.
"I Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54, 84 L. Ed. 77, 60 S. Ct. 60 (1939).
In Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 84 L. Ed. 604, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940),
dealing with the effect, under the Federal Estate tax, of the reservation by
a decedent of a contingent interest in property transferred during his
lifetime, it was held that neither the reenactment by Congress of the
statute without alteration after its interpretation by the Supreme Court,
nor the fact that the Treasury Department had not sought revision of the
Act, barred the Court from reversing its previous decision on the question
of statutory construction. Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice HcReynolds dissented.
109 The following decisions within this category
are typical: Swayne &
Hoyt, Ltd., v. U. S., 300 U. S. 297, 81 L. Ed. 659, 57 S. Ct. 478 (1937)
(suspension of schedule of rates for coastal shipping by the Secretary of
Commerce); U. S. v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Company, 301 U. S.
402, 81 L. Ed. 1186, 57 S. Ct. 804 (1937) (a finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission that spotting service within certain industrial plants
was not a part of the service of transportation) ; Washington, V. & M.
Coach Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U,. S. 142, 81 L. Ed.
965, 57 S. Ct. 648 (1937) (a finding of the Board that the Company had
discriminated against its employees because of membership in a union);
Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society. 302 U. S. 112.
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What constitutes substantial evidence is necessarily a
matter for determination in each particular case. "The
courts cannot pick and choose bits of evidence to make
findings of fact contrary to the findings of the Commission." 110 If there is a sufficient basis for an order, it is not
rendered illegal by some improper motive in the mind of
the officer issuing it."" However, substantial evidence "is
more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. . . . it
must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be

drawn from it is one of fact for the jury. 1112 Judicial
notice can not be assumed of matters connected with the
value of property, especially when the particular or evidential facts of which the Commission took judicial notice
do not appear.1 - "Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
114
does not constitute substantial evidence.
It is in the cases dealing with "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" facts that the most important development has
occurred. The majority opinion in the Ben Avon case 15
announced the doctrine that rate making was an appropriate exercise of the legislative power only when the rates
fixed were not confiscatory, that whether or not they were
82 L. Ed. 141, 58 S. Ct. 113 (1937) (a determination of an unfair trade
practice); Rochester Telephone Corporation v. U. S., 307 U. S. 125, 83
L. Ed. 1147, 59 S. Ct. 754 (1939) (a finding by the Federal Trade Commission that a telephone company was under the control of another company); South Chicago Coal & Dock Company v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251,
84 L. Ed. 732, 60 S. Ct. 544 (1940) (a finding by a Deputy Commissioner
under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act that an
employee was not a member of a crew).
11 Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S.
112,
117, 82 L. Ed. 141, 145, 58 S. Ct. 113, 115 (1939).
111
Isbrandsten-Moller Co. v. U. S., 300 U. S. 139, 81 L. Ed. 562, 57 S. Ct.
407 (1937).
11 National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping
Company, 306 U. S. 292, 300, 83 L. Ed. 660, 665, 59 S. Ct. 501, 505 (1939).
113 Ohio Bell Telephone
Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 301
U. S. 292, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 57 S. Ct. 724 (1937). Cf. McCart v. Indianapolis
Water Company, 302 U. S. 419, 82 L. Ed. 336, 58 S. Ct. 324 (1938), where
an appellate court took judicial notice of an upward trend in prices, but
did not attempt to make a specific application of that trend.
114 Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 305
U. S. 197, 230, 83 L. Ed. 126, 140, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938) (dictum).
11 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 64 L. Ed.
908, 40 S. Ct. 527 (1920). Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Clarke dissented. See Cooper, Administrative Justice and the
Role of Di.eretion (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 577, 588.
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confiscatory depended upon the correctness of the finding
as to value, and that, therefore, in such a proceeding, the
facts must be found by the Court independently of the
action of the administrative tribunal. The same syllogistic reasoning was invoked in Crowell v. Benson"6 to
justify the decision that there must be an independent review of the facts with respect to admiralty jurisdiction and
the employer-employee relation under the Longshoremen's
& Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. It has also been
held that, in deportation proceedings, a person claiming to
be a citizen of the United States is entitled to an inde117
pendent judicial determination of the facts.
There was apparently some modification of the doctrine
as to rate making in the case of St. Joseph Stock Yards
Company v. United States,"" in which the majority opinion stated that, while there must be an independent review
of the facts by the Court, there is, nevertheless, a strong
presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by the
administrative body. The approach to judicial review of
the facts in rate making announced in the St. Joseph case
was followed by the Court in several other decisions." 9
The arguments against the constitutional fact doctrine
are summarized in the concurring opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Brandeis in the St. Joseph Stock Yards case.
The same line of reasoning would call for independent
review of the acts of most administrative agencies. Findings of fact by juries of independent laymen, if supported
by substantial evidence, may be conclusive within the Constitution; the Court has repeatedly held that due process
is not necessarily judicial process. Pragmatically, rate
regulation cannot be effective unless the legality of the
110 285 U. S. 22, 76 L. Ed. 598, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932).
Mr. Justice Brandeis,
Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts dissented.
"I Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 66 L. Ed. 938, 42 S. Ct. 492
(1922).
118 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. Ed. 1088, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936).
Mr. Justice Roberts,
Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice Cardozo concurred
in the result. The last three dissented from the doctrine of independent
judicial review of the facts.
19 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation, 800 U. S. 55, 81
L. Ed. 510, 57 S. Ct. 364 (1937); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U. S.
224. 82 L. Ed. 1304, 58 S. Ct. 883 (1938); Denver Union Stock Yard v.
U. 8., 304 U. S. 470, 82 L. Ed. 1469, 58 S. Ct. 990 (1938).
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rates prescribed may be determined with reasonable
promptness. The determination of the questions of fact
in these complicated cases is a heavy burden for the courts
as well as an emasculation of the rate making administrative process.
In June, 1940, the Court decided the case of Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Company.12 0
That case involved the validity of an oil proration order
promulgated by the Railroad Commission of Texas. The
respondent challenged the administrative order, not merely
as unfair or unreasonable, but as confiscatory. The Federal District Court enjoined the Commission from carrying
the proration plan into effect and was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The decree was reversed by the
Supreme Court in a six to three decision. The majority
opinion, after reviewing the controversy, said:
"The state was confronted with its general problem
of proration and with the special relation to it of the
small tracts in the particular configuration of the East
Texas field. It has chosen to meet these problems
through the day-to-day exertions of a body specially
entrusted with the task because presumably competent to deal with it. In striking the balances that
have to be struck with the complicated and subtle
factors that must enter into such judgments, the Commission has observed established procedure. If the
history of proration is any guide, the present order is
but one more item in a continuous series of adjustments. It is not for the federal courts to supplant the
Commission's judgment even in the face of convincing
proof that a different result would have been better."
(Italics supplied. ) 121
This majority opinion was characterized in the dissent of
Mr. Justice Roberts, in which Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
and Mr. Justice McReynolds joined, as announcing "principles with respect to the review of administrative action
challenged under the due process clause directly contrary
to those which have been established." It is true that the
1-2 310 U. S. 573, 84 L. Ed. 1368, 60 S. Ct. 1021 (1940).
1 310 U. S. 583, 584, 84 L. Ed. 1368, 1374, 60 S. Ct. 1021, 1025 (1940).
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decision dealt with proration of oil rather than the fixing
of rates, and so is distinguishable in that narrow factual
aspect from the Ben Avon case. But it is submitted that
the minority's analysis of the purport of the majority decision is correct, and that the Rowan case goes a long distance, if not the whole way, in reversing the constitutional
fact doctrine as to rights of property. There has been no
express reversal, as there was of the negative order doctrine in the Rochester case, but the remaining step seems
a short one. That the minority opinion in the St. Joseph
case will soon become the holding of a majority of the
Court would seem a not unreasonable prophecy, if it is not
already a statement of fact.
It by no means follows, however, that the Court will no
longer independently review the facts underlying any administrative order. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in the St. Joseph
case, expressly limited his dissent from the doctrine of
independent judicial review of the facts to cases involving
property rights. He was of the opinion that in matters of
personal constitutional rights, the practice of independent
judicial review of facts should be continued. "The second
distinction is between the right to liberty of person and
other constitutional rights. . . .A citizen who claims that
his liberty is being infringed is entitled, upon habeas
corpus, to the opportunity of a judicial determination of
22
the facts."'
There is no logic in the distinction between independent
review of the facts in a rate making case and in a case involving personal liberties. But in our legal system logic is
only one of the component ingredients in the judicial process. 12 Where issues of personal rights are concerned,
298 U. S. 38, 77, 80 L. Ed. 1033, 1054-55, 56 S. Ct. 720, 737 (1936).
"Our fourfold division separates the force of logic or analogy, which
gives us the method of philosophy; the force of history, which gives us the
historical method, or the method of evolution; the force of custom, which
yields the method of tradition; and the force of justice, morals and social
welfare, the more8 of the day, with its outlet or expression in the method
"'

123

of sociology."

CARDozo,

THE GROWTH OF THE LAW

(1924) 62.

"... Mr. Justice Holmes attributed very different legal significance to
those liberties of the individual which history has attested as the indispensible conditions of a free society from that which he attached to
liberties which derived merely from shifting economic arrangements."
FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1938) 50.
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there is no countervailing consideration of expedition. In
such matters as rate making, the general public interest
may be stultified by the delays inherent in independent
judicial review. No economic ills threaten through the
court hearing of a civil liberties case. Here the public interest all lies in the protection of those liberties to the utmost possible extent.124
COOPERATION OF COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS

Some of the most interesting of the recent decisions are
those in which an administrative board and a court appear
as partners, each contributing its own special technique
toward the common aim of good government. Such a case
is the third Morgan case. 25 In the two prior Morgan
cases, 126 orders of the Secretary of Agriculture, fixing rates
for stock yard agencies, had been set aside because, in each
case, the Court held that there had not been the full and
proper hearing which was essential. As a result of these
decisions, the case had been remanded and a fund, consisting of the difference between the scheduled rates and those
prescribed by the Secretary's order, had been paid into the
District Court. The third case involved the proper disposition of this fund. The appellees contended that, under
the Packers and Stockyards Act, there was no legal warrant for restitution of the impounded monies to the patrons
of the market agencies, even though the Secretary should
now determine, by a proper procedure, that the scheduled
rates exceeded the reasonable rates prescribed. The lower
court had granted a motion for distribution of the fund
among the appellees. This order the Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice Stone, in delivering the majority
1' The Court will independently examine the facts in a criminal proceeding to see if there has been a violation of due process of law, Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 84 L. Ed. 716, 60 S. Ct. 472 (1940); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 83 L. Ed. 757, 59 S. Ct. 536 (1939) ; or of the right
of freedom of speech and religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
84 L. Ed. 1213, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940). See also, Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325,
83 L. Ed. 320, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939), as to the issue of United States citizen-

ship In a deportation proceeding.
"I U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 83 L. Ed. 1211, 59 S. Ct. 795 (1939).
126 See supra, n. 47.
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opinion,12 ' held that, even assuming, after the Secretary's
prior order had been set aside, he could not promulgate a
rate order as of the earlier date nor make an order for
payment of the money under the statute, he was nevertheless free to make an order fixing rates for the future. The
District Court, under its general equitable power, could, if
the Secretary's determination had been properly made, use
it as a basis for distributing the funds in its custody. In
that manner, the District Court could both avoid the risk
of using its processes as an instrument of injustice and
could implement by a full use of its own powers a weakness in the administrative procedure.
"Court and agency are the means adopted to attain
the prescribed end and so far as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words should
be construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action. Neither body should repeat in this day
the mistake made by the courts of law when equity
was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of justice; neither can rightly be regarded by the
other as an alien intruder, to be tolerated if must be,
but never to be encouraged or aided128by the other in
the attainment of the common aim.
Another instance of such cooperation is shown in the
case of Palmer v. Massachusetts.29 The bankruptcy trustees of a railroad had applied to the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities for leave to abandon a number of
passenger stations. Hearings were held by the State Department on the questions raised by the application. During the pendency of the hearings and before the State Department had taken any action, the trustees and creditors
of the railroad prayed the Federal District Court, which
127 Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Roberts
dissented. Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
128 307 U. S. 183, 191, 83 L. Ed. 1211, 1217, 59 S. Ct. 795, 800 (1939).
See
also Inland Steel Company v. U. S., 306 U. S. 153, 83 L. Ed. 557, 59 S. Ct.
415 (1939) and General American Tank Car Corporation v. El Dorado
Terminal Company, 308 U. S.422, 84 L. Ed. 361, 60 S. Ct. 235 (1940). See
Hart, supra, n. 91, (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 622; and (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev.
1406.
129308 U. S. 79, 84 L. Ed. 93, 60 S. Ct. 34 (1939).
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had jurisdiction over the bankruptcy proceedings, for an
order directing the trustees to abandon the local services.
The District Judge passed an order granting the relief
prayed. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the order of the lower court and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the
unanimous opinion,"' said:
"The judicial process in bankruptcy proceedings
under §77 is, as it were, brigaded with the administrative process of the Commission. From the requirement of ratification by the Commission of the trustees
appointed by the Court to the Commission's approval
of the Court's plan of reorganization the authority of
the Court is intertwined with that of the Commission.
• . . But, in any event, against possible inconveniences
due to observance of state law we must balance the
feelings of local communities, the dislocation of their
habits and the over-riding of expert state agencies by a
single judge sitting, as in this case, in another state,
removed from familiarity with local problems, and not
necessarily gifted with statesman-like imagination
that
1 31
transcends the wisdom of local attachments.'
In two cases, the cooperation between courts and an administrative agency was evidenced in proceedings in which
judicial discretion was exercised at the behest of the
agency to aid the crystallization of issues important to the
administrative process. In Landis v. North American
Company,132 certain public utility holding companies
brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the enforcement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, on the ground that the act was unconstitutional. At about the same time, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a bill in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York to compel other holding
companies to register with it in accordance with the statute. The defendants in the latter suit also contested the
validity of the act. The Commission prayed for a stay
of the proceedings in the case in the District of Columbia,
1o Mr. Justice Butler took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
131308 U. S. 87, 89, 84 L. Ed. 99, 100, 60 S. Ct. 38, 39 (199).
132299 U. S. 248, 81 L. Ed. 153, 57 S. Ct. 163 (1936).
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in which it was the defendant, until the validity of the act
had been determined by the Supreme Court in the second
case, pledging itself to prosecute with all due diligence
the suit which it had chosen as a test. The Commission's
motion was granted, and the Supreme Court held that the
limitations of the judicial discretion had not, except as to
the length of the stay, been exceeded. Justice Cardozo,
in delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"Especially in cases of extraordinary public moment,
the individual may be required to submit to delay not
immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will
thereby be promoted. In these Holding Company Act
cases great issues are involved, great in their complexity, great in their significance. On the facts, there
will be need for the minute investigation of intercorporate relations, linked in a web of baffling intricacy.
On the law there will be novel problems of far-reaching importance to the parties and the public. An application for a stay in suits so weighty and unusual
will not always -fit within the mould appropriate to
an application for such relief in a suit upon a bill of
goods.""13
In the United States Realty case,'3 4 a corporation had
filed a petition for an arrangement of its unsecured debts
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The Securities
and Exchange Commission does not, under Chapter XI,
have the advisory functions with which it is charged by
Chapter X. It was granted permission to intervene in the
proceedings by the District Court, and thereupon contended, unsuccessfully in that Court, that the proceedings
should have been brought under Chapter X. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by the Commission, holding that it had no right to intervene and hence
no right to appeal. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed this holding. Mr. Justice Stone, in delivering the opinion of the majority of the Court, said:
' 299 U. S. 256, 81 L. Ed. 159, 57 S. Ct. 166.
134 Securities & Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improve-

ment Company, 310 U. S. 434, 84 L. Ed. 1693, 60 S. Ct. 1044 (1940).
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"The Commission is, as we have seen, charged with
the performance of important public duties in every
case brought under chapter X, which will be thwarted,
to the public injury, if a debtor may secure adjustment of his debts in a chapter XI proceeding when,
upon the applicable principles which we have discussed, he should be required to proceed, if at all,
under Chapter X ....
The Commission did not here
intervene to perform the advisory functions required
of it by chapter X, but to object to an improper exercise of the court's jurisdiction which, if permitted to
continue, contrary to the court's own equitable duty in
the premises, would defeat the public interests which
the Commission was designated to represent." 135

Apart from the specific holdings of the decisions here
considered, viewing them as an entity, two strong currents
of judicial intent emerge.
The Court desires, and succeeds in its desire, to show
the importance and nature of the administrative process.
The cases are expositions of "the practical functions" of
the various administrative agencies whose processes have
come before it, and of how they are "to be reconciled to
existing governmental machinery, for the vindication of
the rights of the public." 1 6 At some distant date, a student
of the American civilization of the first part of the twentieth century could probably do no better than to go to the
decisions of the Supreme Court for their analyses of some
of the social and economic questions which beset us and
of how we are attempting to solve them. There he will
find the reasons for and the workings of the administrative
process in such diverse fields as agriculture, 13 7 the coal in235 310 U. S. 458, 459, 84 L. Ed. 1305, 60 S. Ct. 1054 (1940).
Mr. Justice
Roberts, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented.
Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision.
188Chief Justice Taft, in the proceedings on the death of Chief Justice
White, 257 U. S. v, xxv, quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Roche8ter
case, 307 U. S. 138, n. 15.
117 United States of America v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U. S. 533,
83 L. Ed. 1446, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939) ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 83 L.
Ed. 441, 59 S. Ct. 379 (1939); and Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441,
80 L. Ed. 1210, 57 S. Ct. 842 (1937).
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dustry, 15 radio broadcasting,13 9 telephone communication, 140 and the manifold business of the Government
itself. 4 '
There is hardly a case, among them all, which does not
make clear, either expressly or by implication, that judicial review is only one phase in the development of the
administrative process. Not the least hopeful sign in that
development is the increase in the study of administrative
proceedings by agencies other than the courts. The Monographs of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Law,' 42 the Final Report of the Attorney General's
Committee,' 4 ' the House Committee Investigation of the
Labor Board and Wagner Act, the debates in and out of
Congress on the recently vetoed Walter-Logan Bill, the
growing insistence in magazines and press upon securing
and maintaining the highest possible type of personnel for
the manning of administrative agencies, the studies made
by many of those agencies of their own workings, all show
we are beginning to realize that the successful conduct of
this phase of government, which affects our lives in so
many ways, is a charge upon all the instruments of our
democracy.
'8
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 84 L. Ed. 1263,
60 S. Ct. 907 (1940).
1"' Federal Communications
Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Company, 309 U. S. 134, 84 L. Ed. 656, 60 S. Ct. 437 (1940).
140 Rochester Telephone Corporation v. U. S., supra, n. 109.
141 Tennessee
Electric Power Company v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
306 U. S. 118, 83 L. Ed. 543, 59 S. Ct. 366 (1939) and Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Company, 310 U. S. 113, 84 L. Ed. 1108, 60 S. Ct. 869 (1940).
142 Supra, n. 46.
143 Administrative
Procedure in Government Agencies, U. S. Govt. Printing Office (1941) 77th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 8.

